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BEYOND THE CALL OF BEAUTY:  
EVERYDAY AESTHETIC DEMANDS UNDER PATRIARCHY 
 
 




ABSTRACT. This paper defends two claims. First, we will argue for the 
existence of aesthetic demands in the realm of everyday aesthetics, and 
that these demands are not reducible to moral demands. Second, we will 
argue that we must recognise the limits of these demands in order to 
combat a widespread form of gendered oppression. The concept of 
aesthetic supererogation offers a new structural framework to 
understand both the pernicious nature of this oppression and what may 





ÒYou canÕt leave the house looking like that.Ó 
ÒYou shouldnÕt wear that tie with that shirt.Ó 
ÒYouÕre too old for that hairstyle.Ó 
ÒYou canÕt play that horrible music at my party.Ó 




A recognisable feature of our lives is that we make aesthetic demands of each other. 
As the above examples show, we demand that people meet certain aesthetic 
standards and hold them accountable when they do not. These aesthetic demands are 
particularly prevalent in the realm of everyday aesthetics. We demand that people 
dress according to certain standards for certain jobs or social occasions. We demand 
that those we live with keep our homes in line with certain aesthetic standards 
(though as many couples and flatmates will recognise, these standards vary greatly).  
!Up to now the literature on aesthetic requirements has said surprisingly little 
about the realm of everyday aesthetics. Everyday aesthetic demands have also 
received relatively little attention in the growing literature on everyday aesthetics. 
This is less surprising, given it has only recently become a focus of sustained 
philosophical inquiry: the main focus of attention has been on defining the field of 
everyday aesthetics1, on describing everyday aesthetic experiences or categories2, and 
on explaining the importance of the field.3    
This paper will defend two claims. First, we will argue for the existence of 
aesthetic demands in the realm of everyday aesthetics and that these demands are not 
reducible to moral demands. Second, we will argue that recognising the limits of 
these demands helps us analyse and understand a prevalent form of gendered 
oppression. We will start in Section One by arguing in support of the existence of 
aesthetic obligations in the realm of everyday aesthetics. We will then, in Section 
Two, argue that these obligations are not reducible to moral obligations. In Section 
Three, we will argue that in addition to aesthetic obligations, there is also good 
reason to think cases of aesthetic supererogation exist in the realm of everyday 
aesthetics. Finally, in Section Four, we will argue that accepting the existence of 
aesthetic supererogation has an important role to play in understanding and 
potentially combatting one form of gendered oppression. 
Before we begin, it is worth briefly clarifying how we will use the term 
everyday aesthetics. Our use will follow Crispin SartwellÕs (2005, 761) claim, 
ÒEveryday Aesthetics refers to the possibility of aesthetic experience of non-art 
objects and events.Ó Included in everyday aesthetics then are our aesthetic 
experiences of non-art objects like tables, chairs, bicycles, clothes, and buildings; our 
!aesthetic experiences of food and drink4; our aesthetic experiences of the natural and 
built environment5; and our aesthetic experiences of our own bodies and those of 
other people.6  
This definition is broader than others in the literature. For example, Tom 
Leddy (2012b, 8-9) specifically rules out nature from his account which defines 
everyday aesthetics as concerning Òobjects that are not art or nature.Ó Kevin 
Melchionne (2013), on the other hand, emphasizes the everyday in his definition in 
reference to Òthe aspects of our lives marked by widely shared, daily routines or 
patterns to which we tend to impart an aesthetic character.Ó Our definition of 
everyday aesthetics is broader than both, as it includes nature and aesthetic 
experiences that may not be part of widely shared daily routines, such as 
preparationsÑof the body, of oneÕs homeÑfor a wedding (Cahill 2003). We adopt 
this broad definition of everyday aesthetics in order to show the wide range of cases 
in which these aesthetic demands occur. 
 
1. AESTHETIC OBLIGATIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE 
 
At the start of this paper, we provided examples of demands we make of each other 
in the realm of everyday aesthetics. In this section, we argue that these demands are 
plausible cases of aesthetic obligation.  
While the existence of aesthetic obligations is far from universally accepted in 
the literature, 7  two persuasive arguments have been given in support of their 
existance. First, Howard Press argues that aesthetic obligations arise from principles, 
such as, ÒOne ought to appreciate what is beautifulÓ (Press 1969, 525). This could 
!take the form of a friend encouraging that you Òreally ought to go see FabritiusÕ The 
Goldfinch exhibit while itÕs touring Scotland.Ó We can extend this principle to a host 
of examples in everyday aesthetics: one ought to take the time to pay due sensitivity 
to what is beautiful in oneÕs environment. Consider a visitor to a university campus 
learning their host had never seen its magnificent forestÑrenowned for its 
summertime blossoms and autumnal foliage. The visitor would be entitled to think 
that their host is blameworthy.  
As well as having obligations to appreciate what is aesthetically valuable it also 
seems plausible to think that we are required not to damage or destroy what is 
beautiful. In her discussion of everyday aesthetic demands, Yuriko Saito (2008, 214) 
notes that those who vandalise the environment are often subject to harsh criticism. 
To give our own example of such a case (see Archer and Ware 2017), consider the 
following: In June 2014, a beauty spot on Scolty Hill near Banchory in Scotland was 
vandalized. The vandals were subject to intense criticism, with one local councillor 
saying: ÒIt is a horrendous mess and people should be ashamed of themselves for 
spoiling our beautiful landscape in this selfish wayÓ (Deeside and Piper Herald 2014). 
Those who have damaged this beautiful part of the world are blameworthy for the 
disregard they have shown to the aesthetic value of the landscape.  
Another plausible example of an aesthetic obligation found in SaitoÕs 
discussion of aesthetic demands concerns personal appearance. Satio (2008, 213) 
points to a case of Northwestern UniversityÕs lacrosse team causing offence on a 
meeting to the White House by wearing flip-flops. This was seen to show a lack of 
respect. This is a clear example of an aesthetic demand that we make of each other. 
We demand that people dress in a way that shows respect, particularly on important 
!occasions such as meeting the President or attending a wedding or a funeral. Those 
who fail to do so are subject to similar negative reactions as these atheletes. We also 
make aesthetic demands of each other to keep our surroundings pleasant, particularly 
our homes. The flatmate who makes no effort to help tidy before the arrival of a 
guest can rightly be criticized.  The flatmate who insists on playing awful music wonÕt 
escape criticism either.  
Marcia Eaton (2008) gives a second reason to accept the existence of aesthetic 
obligations. She argues that if there are aesthetic dilemmas, then there must be 
aesthetic obligations from which such dilemmas originate. Eaton discusses a classic 
Òburning museum caseÓ in which one has to make a choice between saving one of 
two paintings: both alike in their ability to enlighten, please, educate, and provoke 
wonder, but the second being more beautiful. Eaton notes that those working in art 
restoration often face these kinds of aesthetic dilemmas. She concludes that the 
Ògreat painsÓ restorers take in recording exactly what alterations were made, and the 
Òsense of real lossÓ experienced when restoration requires removal of the artistÕs 
workÑsuch as when one painting lies atop a firstÑare indicative of a genuinely felt 
obligation (Eaton 2008, 4-5).  
A clear example of this kind of dilemma in everyday aesthetics is found in 
cases of land development. Suppose that there is an economic and social need to 
build a railway connecting two cities. Investigation of the railwayÕs possible routes 
yields two possibilities. The railway could either pass through a beautiful forest or 
along a majestic piece of coastland. This decision would not be taken lightly by the 
developers. Both areas of beauty make claims on us not to destroy them and 
whichever is lost will be cause for regret. This challenge is indicative of a genuinely 
!felt obligation. In these cases, to the extent that what demands consideration by the 
decision-maker are the aesthetic properties of the object, it is this realm of properties 
that makes the dilemma an aesthetic one, rather than an economic or moral one. If 
moral dilemmas emerge out of a conflict of moral obligations, then the existence of 
genuine aesthetic dilemmas indicates a conflict between competing aesthetic 
obligations. 
There is good reason, therefore, to think that aesthetic demands exist in the 
realm of everyday aesthetics. The principles Ôappreciate the beautifulÕ and Ôdo not 
damage or destroy what is beautifulÕ both seem plausible obligation-generating 
principles that provide genuine cases of aesthetic obligations in everyday aesthetics. 
Moreover, it also seems plausible to think there exist aesthetic obligations to 
maintain certain aesthetic standards for our personal appearance and surroundings. 
Finally, we gave an example of an everyday aesthetic dilemma which also gives 
reason to think that aesthetic obligations exist.  
 
2. AESTHETIC DEMANDS ARE NOT REDUCIBLE TO MORAL DEMANDS 
 
One objection that might be raised against our claims in the previous Section is that 
what we have called aesthetic demands are really just moral demands with aesthetic 
content (MacCallum and Widdows 2016, 7-9; Widdows 2017). After all, it seems 
reasonable to think that we can legitimately morally demand of each other that we do 
not prevent others from having valuable experiences. Someone who vandalises an 
area of natural beauty would be violating this moral demand. Similarly, the demands 
of personal appearance could stem from the moral demand to behave respectfully 
!towards others. Finally, the demand to keep our surroundings pleasant could stem 
from the moral principle not to harm others (even when that harm is fairly trivial, 
like the imposition of Nickleback on a group of partygoers). While all these demands 
have aesthetic content, it could be argued that this does not show that the demands 
are aesthetic ones. This objection has been raised against the claim that aesthetic 
obligations exist.8 If all supposed cases of aesthetic obligation can plausibly be 
understood as moral obligations, then it seems like we can explain the normative 
force of the demands without making reference to aesthetic obligations. Given this, 
there seems little reason to think that there are any distinctly aesthetic obligations. 
Three replies can be made to this objection. First, supporters of aesthetic 
obligations can accept that moral demands are present in all of the cases considered 
above. This does not rule out the possibility that there also exist distinctly aesthetic 
obligations in these cases. The demands in these cases may be over-determined and 
stem from both moral obligations and aesthetic obligations.  
By itself this response may not convince many. While there could be two 
distinct kinds of demand present in these cases, the more parsimonious explanation 
for the felt demand in these cases is that this can be fully explained by the presence 
of a moral obligation. In the absence of additional reasons to accept this response, 
there seems good reason to continue to take this objection seriously. 
Moreover, this response faces another objection. It might be argued that any 
aesthetic demands in these examples cannot be disentangled from moral demands. 
Saito (2008, 238) suggests that when it comes to considering the kinds of examples 
we discussed in Section One, our aesthetic judgements both contribute and are 
responsive to our moral judgements. This means that it is not possible to fully 
!separate our moral and aesthetic judgements in these cases. Accepting this claim 
would cast doubt on the claim that there are two distinct kinds of obligation present.  
However, there is a good additional reason to think that a distinctly aesthetic 
obligation is at work here. Consider again the case of Scotly HillÕs vandalism. This is 
a clear case of moral wrongdoing: the vandalism was damaging to the local 
environment and harmful to all those who enjoy the areaÕs beautiful scenery. We may 
think that our negative reactions to this case could be fully explained by the violation 
of a moral obligation. On closer examination though, this explanation appears 
insufficient, as our moral disapproval does not exhaust our negative reactions to this 
case. While we feel moral outrage or resentment towards those who vandalize beauty 
spots in this way, we also feel a distinct kind of revulsion that is not present in other 
cases of moral wrongdoing. This revulsion is expressed in the reaction of a local 
Paths Association to the Scolty Hill vandalism when he says: ÒThose who cause such 
ugliness have very ugly mindsÓ (Deeside and Piper Herald 2014). This is not just an 
expression of moral outrage but also of aesthetic outrage.9 There is a distinct and 
severe aesthetic criticism being levelled here, that we will call aesthetic blame. The 
vandals are not just criticized for being immoral but for having ugly minds. While 
clearly a less serious offence, someone who wear flip-flops to the White House might 
also be criticized for showing a lack of aesthetic appreciation, as might the flatmate 
who inflicts untidiness on his cohabitants.  This suggests a distinctly aesthetic form of 
disapproval levelled towards those who have violated their obligation to protect what 
is beautiful. This form of aesthetic disapproval gives a reason to think that a 
distinctively aesthetic wrong was committed. This means that even if we accept that 
many cases of aesthetic obligation will also be morally obligatory, there is still good 
!reason to think that aesthetic obligations are not reducible to moral obligations. 
Moreover, even if we think our aesthetic and moral judgements are impossible to 
disentangle, we still have good reason to think that there are distinctly aesthetic 
obligations. The distinct negative response we have to such cases shows that these are 
not simply cases of moral obligation.  
The final reply is that it does not seem plausible to think that moral obligations 
are present in all of the cases considered in Section One. The professor who never 
visits the forest near her office and so fails to conform to the principle Ôappreciate 
what is beautifulÕ is failing in some way. However, it is not plausible to think of this 
as a moral failing. We would be unlikely to respond to the professor with resentment 
or question her moral character. We would, though, question her aesthetic 
sensibilities and lose faith in her commitment to beauty.  
We have given three responses to the concern that the examples of everyday 
aesthetic obligations offered are really cases of moral obligations. First, the claim that 
moral obligations exist in these examples is compatible with there also existing 
aesthetic obligations. Second, there is a distinctly aesthetic form of censure operating 
here, in addition to any moral censure. Finally, the claim that all of the examples 
given in Section One are morally obligatory does not look plausible when applied to 
the case of the professorÕs obligation to appreciate what is beautiful. 
 
3. AESTHETIC SUPEREROGATION 
 
We have argued that there exist aesthetic obligations in the realm of everyday 
aesthetics. We will now argue that in addition to aesthetic obligations there also exist 
!cases of aesthetic supererogation in everyday aesthetics. 10  Before we do this, 
however, we must first explain the concept of moral supererogation.  
The term supererogation is roughly equivalent to the phrase Ôbeyond the call of 
dutyÕ. Acts of supererogation are those that are morally good but not morally 
required. The contemporary discussion of supererogation in moral theory is generally 
accepted to have begun with J.O. UrmsonÕs (1958) paper, ÒSaints and HeroesÓ. 
Urmson argues that there exist acts that are morally good but not morally required. 
To support this claim he offers the following example:  
We may imagine a squad of soldiers to be practicing the throwing 
of live hand grenades; a grenade slips from the hand of one of 
them and rolls on the ground near the squad; one of them 
sacrifices his life by throwing himself on the grenade and 
protecting his comrades with his own body (1958, 63).  
 
As Urmson notes, this seems like a clear case of morally admirable, praiseworthy 
behaviour. However, Urmson then give two reasons to think that these acts are not 
morally required. First, it would not be appropriate to demand that the soldier dive 
on the grenade (Urmson 1958, 63). Given that moral obligations are generally 
thought to be acts that it is appropriate to demand that other people perform (Mill 
2001, 49), this gives us good reason to think that the soldierÕs act was not morally 
required. Second, no one could legitimately reproach the soldier if he had failed to 
act as he did (1958, 64). This gives us good reason to think that the soldierÕs act was 
not morally required, at least if we accept the popular view that moral requirements 
are conceptually tied to blame.11 
In the wake of UrmsonÕs discussion, several philosophers have sought to 
provide a precise account of supererogation. While there is no complete agreement 
on how to understand supererogation, the following are generally thought to be 
!plausible necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept:  
An act is supererogatory if and only if:  
1. It is morally optional (neither morally required nor morally forbidden). 
2. It is morally better than the minimum that morality demands (e.g., Ferry 
2013, 574; Heyd 1982, 5).   
Recently, philosophers have begun to investigate whether cases of 
supererogation exist in normative domains other than morality, such as the epistemic 
domain (Herdberg 2014) and the domain of prudence (McElwee Forthcoming). 
Elsewhere (Archer and Ware 2017), we have argued that it is also plausible to think 
that cases of aesthetic supererogation exist. We provided the following account of 
aesthetic supererogation: 
An act is aesthetically supererogatory if and only if:  
1. It is aesthetically optional (neither required nor forbidden from the 
aesthetic point of view). 
2. It is aesthetically better than the minimum that is required from the 
aesthetic point of view.  
In order to defend the claim that cases of aesthetic supererogation exist in the realm 
of everyday aesthetics we must find cases that meet both of these conditions.  
In fact all of the examples we looked at in Section One can be modified to be 
cases of aesthetic supererogation. Take the obligation to appreciate the beautiful. We 
claimed that someone who never made the five-minute trip to appreciate the 
beautiful forest was doing something wrong. However, someone who spends most 
of their weekends travelling to sights of natural beauty seems to surpass the limits of 
this obligation. Similarly, the obligation not to damage or destroy what is beautiful 
!generated obligations not engage in the destruction of beauty spots can also be 
surpassed. Take for example the case of Michael Forbes who was offered significant 
sums of money to sell his house on the Menie Estate near Aberdeen to enable 
Donald J. Trump to build a golf course. Forbes decided not to sell his house in order 
to try and prevent Trump from building a golf course on this beautiful part of the 
Scottish coastline. In doing so, Forbes not only lost out on receiving an inflated price 
for his house, he also left himself open to a barrage of public criticism from Trump 
and his employees (Carrell 2008). This surpasses any reasonable aesthetic obligations 
that Forbes may have had in this case. Finally, the obligation to meet certain aesthetic 
standards for oneÕs personal appearance and living areas can also be surpassed. While 
wearing flip-flops to meet the President may be aesthetically wrong, spending a 
significant amount of oneÕs savings on a beautiful designer dress for this meeting 
would be supererogatory. Similarly, someone who devotes all his time to making his 
home as beautiful as possible also seems to surpass any aesthetic obligation he has to 
make his surroundings pleasant.  
 
4. THE NEED FOR LIMITS ON EVERYDAY AESTHETIC DEMANDS  
 
There is good reason then to think that there are aesthetic obligations in the realm of 
everyday aesthetics and that it is possible to go beyond these obligations to perform 
acts of aesthetic supererogation. We will now show the important role that the 
recognition of these categories could have in combatting gendered oppression. We 
will first point out an oppressive gender imbalance in everyday aesthetic demands. 
!We will then argue that recognising the existence of aesthetic supererogation has an 
important role to play in combatting this challenge.  
To begin, letÕs consider Naomi WolfÕs claim in The Beauty Myth (1990) that the 
norms of beauty have an oppressive impact on womenÕs freedom. Wolf uses the 
term Òthe beauty mythÓ to refer to a dominant set of norms that proscribe how 
women should look. Wolf summarises this myth in the following:  
The beauty myth tells a story: The quality called ÒbeautyÓ 
objectively and universally exists. Women must want to embody it 
and men must want women who embody it. This embodiment is 
an imperative for women and not for men, which situation is 
necessary and natural because it is biological, sexual and 
evolutionary: Strong men battle for beautiful women, and beautiful 
women are more reproductively successful. WomenÕs beauty must 
correlate to their fertility, and since this system is based on sexual 
selection, it is inevitable and changeless (1990, 12). 
 
Wolf claims the beauty myth is wrong on each of these points. There is, for example, 
no universally accepted standards of beauty and no legitimate evolutionary basis for 
the myth (1990, 12).12 
How can such a mistaken myth be so prevalent? The answer according to Wolf 
is that it serves to protect the interests of male power and male-dominated 
institutions. The beauty myth entrenches male power by crippling women 
psychologically, by offering employers an excuse to fire women, and by constraining 
women into complying with their gender role. In WolfÕs words:  
An economy that depends on slavery needs to promote images of 
slaves that ÔjustifyÕ the institution of slavery. Western economies 
are absolutely dependent now on the continued underpayment of 
women. An ideology that makes women feel Ôworth lessÕ was 
urgently needed to counteract the way feminism had begun to 
make us feel worth more (1990, 18).  
 
!WolfÕs point is that the beauty myth serves to make women feel as if they are failing 
to live up to the basic norms of society and so are undeserving of a proper share of 
societyÕs rewards.  
 Note that these problems are not exclusive to those pronounced female at 
birth. The aesthetic demands placed on cis women also exist, and are arguably 
amplified, for trans women. As Laurie Penny states: 
If we locate contemporary patriarchal oppression within the 
mechanisms of global capitalism, the experience of trans women, 
who can find themselves pressured to spend large amounts of 
money in order to ÔpassÕ as female, is a more urgent version of the 
experience of cis women under patriarchal capitalism. In Western 
societies, where shopping for clothes and makeup is a key coming-
of-age ritual for cis women, all people wishing to express a female 
identity must grapple with the brutal dictats of the beauty, diet, 
advertising and fashion industries in order to ÔpassÕ as female 
(2010, 40). 
 
Further examples of how beauty myths are not just about cis women include 
instances of trans women seeking sex reassignment surgury in the UK being turned 
away for wearing trousers to an appointment (43-44).  
WolfÕs account of the beauty myth is important for our purposes because of 
the important role that the perception of a duty to conform to these norms has for 
enabling the myth to survive. Though Wolf does not use the terms duty and 
obligation, she claims that a crucial part of the beauty myth is the idea that attaining 
these norms is Òan imperative for women and not for menÓ (1990, 12). In other 
words, adhering to these norms is not seen as optional or trivial for women 
(Widdows 2017; GirlsÕ Attitudes Survey 2016, 5-6).  
This claim is entirely plausible. We do not have to look far to find cases of 
women claiming that they have an obligation to conform to certain aesthetic 
!standards. In a BBC Radio 4 (2009) interview, the actress Joan Rivers explained her 
decision to undergo numerous plastic surgery operations to protect her looks by 
saying, ÒI think I owe it to the people not to become a little dottery old lady.Ó RiversÕ 
claim that she owes it to people to act in this way suggests that she views this as her 
duty. A similar claim can be found in the following testimony of an anonymous 
correspondent in Nutritional Concerns for Women (Parham and White 1994, 366-367) on 
her decision to begin a weight-loss program: ÒI owe it to my husband and children to 
lose this fat so that I can be the healthy, attractive wife and mother they deserve. I 
have been bad in allowing myself to get this way and now I just have to suffer to lose 
it.Ó  
In both examples, the women view the need to become more attractive as an 
obligation. They claim that becoming more attractive is something they owe to others. 
But are these experiences of moral obligations, aesthetic obligations, or both? 
Plausibly, at least part of this experience is that of an aesthetic requirement. The 
concern of these women of letting down family or public seems more reasonably 
understood as an aesthetic concern than a moral one. This becomes clear when we 
imagine what kind of negative reactions these women would deem themselves as 
worthy of if they failed to meet their obligation. It seems unlikely that they would 
deem themselves worthy of the form of blame and resentment that are legitimate 
responses to moral criticism. Rather, their concern would be that they will be liable 
to the distinctly aesthetic form of blame we discussed earlier.  
Once we have accepted that these are experiences of aesthetic obligation, a 
new perspective on the oppressive power of the beauty myth opens up. An 
important part of the beauty myth is its insistence that women face more demanding 
!aesthetic obligations than men. One case demonstrating the force of such obligations 
as particularly salient to women concerns a pair of television co-hosts on the popular 
Australian Today breakfast show. Responding to the daily criticism and sartorial 
commentary host Lisa Wilkinson received from viewers regarding her on-air style, 
host Karl Stefanovik tried an experiment: he wore the same blue suit on the show for 
over a year. No one noticed, no one cared, no one wrote in (Adewunmi 2014). The 
comparative point here is that while men may feel certain aesthetic obligations, they 
are not held to them, and do not feel them as keenly as women do. Thinking about 
the case in this way allows us to see the mechanics of the oppression of the beauty 
myth more clearly. There are legitimate aesthetic demands that we can make of each 
other and we rightly feel a need to ensure we live up to them. The beauty myth 
subverts these legitimate feelings of aesthetic obligation into a repressive tool. By 
holding women to more demanding standards of aesthetic obligation, the beauty 
myth makes women feel unattractive, worthless, and despondent.  
We might think that the problem is that women are being held to the wrong 
aesthetic ideal: one which involves expensive hairstyling, well-kept nails, regular body 
waxing, shaving, bleaching, threading, and plucking, cosmetic enhancements, soft 
and dewey skin, a tidy and fit physique, and an appropriate range of well-fitting, 
seasonable clothes, shoes, and accessories. This might lead us to criticize women 
who choose to present themselves in this way for propagating the mistaken aesthetic 
ideals of the beauty myth. Bordo (1993) and Jeffreys (2005), for example, argue for 
the harmfulness of such ideals as stemming from the harmfulness of the practices 
often required to attain them.13 Murnen and Seabrook (2012, 440) indicate that we 
might also critique beauty ideals themselves as Òfunctionally and symbolically 
!disempowering to womenÓ. Penny identifies a clear case of one problematic ideal: ÒIt 
is not enough for women such as Victoria Beckham and Angelina Jolie to be 
preternaturally thin; they must be seen to be suffering to be thin, to be starving 
themselvesÓ (2010, 33). Comparatively, where the content of the aesthetic ideals to 
which women are held can be unhealthy or arbitrary, male ideals feature 
predominately positive qualities of, e.g., physical strength (Jeffreys 2005, 95, 128). 
Relatedly, as historian Elspeth Brown (2012, 55) points out regarding aesthetic ideals 
in contemporary fashion modelling, due to the industryÕs early association with 
prostitution, fashion houses have explicitely promoted an:  
Anglo-Saxon beauty ideal whose cultivated, middle-class status 
clearly signalled through gesture, presence, family history, and of 
course public relations [. . .] a sanitized sexuality central to the 
commodification of the female form under capitalism (2012, 55). 
 
Where the content of an aesthetic ideal is itself unhealthy or classist, such ideals are 
prima facie problematic. One way of reacting to this situation would be to engage in a 
rejection of all of the aesthetic ideals endorsed by the beauty myth. However, as Wolf 
argues in the following discussion, this is the wrong approach: 
The real issue has nothing to do with whether women wear 
makeup or donÕt, gain weight or lose it, have surgery or shun it, 
dress up or dress down, make our clothing and faces and bodies 
into works of art or ignore adornment altogether. The real problem is 
our lack of choiceÓ (1990, 272). 
 
The reason for this is that not all of the ideals endorsed by the beauty myth are 
obviously problematic, some of these ideals may be wrong and yet others may 
genuinely pick out aesthetic goods. Psychologist Nancy Etcoff (2000, 8) contends, 
ÒBeauty is a basic pleasure. Try to imagine that you have become immune to beauty. 
Chances are, you would consider yourself unwellÑsunk in a physical, spiritual or 
!emotional malaise.Ó Can it be an aesthetic good to take pleasure in matching your 
manicure to your bathing suit? Sure. As Neumann argues,  
WomenÕs and menÕs urge for beauty in all its variantsÑin the fine 
arts, architecture, and in everyday life with home decoration and 
dressÑappears to be an important part of what makes life 
meaningful. [. . .] Acknowledging that beauty matters as a major 
source of creativity and life expressions may be a way out of the 
double bind that exhorts us to invest heavily in our appearance 
and to be ridiculed for it at the same time (2017, 393).14  
 
Aiming to maintain an immaculate home as a beauty ideal can also be a genuine 
aesthetic good. 
If some of these ideals are genuine aesthetic goods, then why is it 
problematic to encourage people to live up to them? The concept of aesthetic 
supererogation provides the answer to this question. The right response to the 
beauty myth is not to reject all beauty ideals, nor to deny beauty a prominent place in 
a meaningful life. Some of the ideals of the beauty myth should be rejected 
altogether. For others though, the problem is not with the ideal but with the demand 
that all women should live up to the ideal. The problem we identify, then, lies in 
treating cases of aesthetic supererogation as aesthetically required. It is when this 
distinction remains unacknowledged that an individual can feel they have a lack of 
choice. 
There are (at least) three reasons why this lack of choice is so problematic. 
First, as Wolf makes clear, this removal of choice harms women by making them feel 
guilty and worthless for failing to live up to the beauty mythÕs demands. Guilt is 
often tied to a sense of obligation. Self-discrepancy theory, developed by 
psychologist Edward Higgins (1987), provides a way to understand this connection. 
According to this theory: 
!Individuals hold self-perceptions in three domains: the ÔactualÕ self 
(the attributes we believe we have); the ÔidealÕ self (the attributes 
we aspire to have); and the ÔoughtÕ self (the attributes we believe 
we should have). When discrepancies arise between these 
perceptions, it can lead to negative emotions and cognitions. 
Specifically, discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self 
can result in dejection-related emotions such as disappointment 
and sadness, whereas discrepancy between the actual self and the 
ought self can result in agitation-related emotions such as anxiety 
and guilt. These types of discomfort lead people to engage in 
behaviours designed to resolve the discrepancies (MacCallum and 
Widdows 2016, 6). 
 
While a given goal may be a genuine aesthetic goodÑsuch as a beautiful homeÑ
oneÕs experience will differ given whether she takes the goal as aspirational or 
normative. However, no one should feel guilty for not having an immaculate home: 
that is an overly demanding obligation, yet the experience of guilt in precisely this 
everyday areaÑdetailed, for example, in a series of interviews conducted by Penny 
(2010, 49-51)Ñindicates that such ideals are often experienced as obligations.15 
 A second problem is that this lack of choice closes off the possibility of a 
wholehearted dedication to other activities. Someone who dedicates herself to living 
up to standards of aesthetic perfection will be unlikely to have the time to dedicate 
themselves to pursuing other valuable ways of life, such as one dedicated to pursuing 
epistemic or moral goods (Cahill 2003, 52). Becoming a great scientist, historian, or 
philosopher requires a level of dedication that may (unfortunately) be incompatible 
with aesthetic perfection. This lack of choice also hinders other forms of aesthetic 
excellence. Those pursuing perfection in their appearance will also be unlikely to 
become great composers, game designers, or novelists.  
What this tells us then is that there is a need to place limits on the aesthetic 
demands that are made, in order to protect the freedom of women (or indeed of 
!anyone) to pursue projects and commitments that clash with the pursuit of aesthetic 
perfection. The concept of aesthetic supererogation has a crucial role to play in 
persuading people of their freedom not to feel obligated to meet the standards of 
aesthetic perfection. Those who accept the need to meet some aesthetic norms and 
who believe that the pursuit of aesthetic perfection can be valuable, may be 
persuaded that the aesthetic norms they must meet are ones approaching perfection. 
An important way of responding to this deceptive slight of hand on the part of 
proponents of the beauty myth is to acknowledge that in aesthetics, as in morality, 




We have defended two claims in this paper. First we argued that it is plausible to 
think that cases of aesthetic obligation exist in the realm of everyday aesthetics, and 
that these are not reducible to moral demands. Then we argued that it is plausible 
that cases of aesthetic supererogation also exist in this domain. From these claims, 
we can now identify how accepting the existence of aesthetic supererogation has an 
important role to play in understanding and potentially combatting an important 
form of gendered oppression.  
Our arguments in this paper are important for at least three reasons. First, we 
have contributed to the growing literature on aesthetic obligation by arguing that 
both aesthetic obligation and aesthetic supererogation exist in the realm of everyday 
aesthetics. Second, we have extended the current discussion of aesthetic obligations 
to examine the limits of aesthetic demands. Most importantly though we have sought 
!to show how an understanding of aesthetic obligation and aesthetic supererogation 
can enhance our understanding of oppressive aesthetic demands which could 
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